Introduction
The Government intends to replace the Mental Health Act 1983, and the most recent of its proposals were contained in the Draft Mental Health Bill published in June 2004.
3 (The Draft Bill has undergone 'pre-legislative scrutiny', and the Joint Committee appointed to perform the task published its report on 23 March 2005. 4 The Government published its response to that report on 13 July 2005.
5 )
The 1983 Act is now very different to the statute introduced at the end of 1982. Parliament and the courts have made a number of significant changes over the last 20-odd years, and they have brought us a lot closer to the next Mental Health Act than many people -and possibly even the Government -suppose. In fact, those changes may have brought us rather close to the Draft Mental Health Bill. That will be an uncomfortable thought for many people. This paper will consider five key aspects of the Draft Mental Health Bill:
• the provisions dealing with risk and treatability;
• the notion of compulsion in the community;
• the status of the Code of Practice; and • the abolition of the Approved Social Worker.
The paper will ask whether, because of the changes of the last two decades, the current Mental Health Act has already arrived at much the same point. In addition, the paper will consider the position of incapable patients. Although the Draft Bill contains precious few proposals about them, the paper will ask whether recent developments have made a broad definition of mental disorder all but essential.
The Relevant Conditions
The Draft Mental Health Bill is about far more than 'detention'. The powers it contains will be capable of being used, not just in hospitals, but also in the community. A patient against whom the expanded powers are used will be said to be "subject to compulsion".
Once a person is found to be suffering from mental disorder, as that term is to be broadly defined, it will be possible under the Draft Bill to make him subject to compulsion if each of the Relevant Conditions is met. 6 There are five Relevant Conditions, and some of them are extremely controversial.
(a) Risk
It is the Third Relevant Condition that deals with the risk a person must pose, either to himself or others, before he can be made subject to compulsion. It will be possible to make a person subject to compulsion if that is necessary for the protection of other persons.
9 That proposal is controversial in itself, 10 but the proposal concerning people whose only risk is to themselves is equally so.
For compulsion to be possible in those circumstances, the Third Relevant Condition says it will have to be "necessary, for the protection of the patient from suicide or serious self-harm, or serious neglect by him of his health or safety, [...] that medical treatment be provided" to him.
11
The Government says that in comparison to the 1983 Act, "the threshold of harm to self has been raised".
12 It is certainly true that the current Mental Health Act affords the patient much less leeway: in allowing him to be detained for his own health or safety, it doesn't require that the risk is 'serious'. 13 Yet, for all that, it seems likely that the Draft Bill would do no more than give statutory recognition to the present state-of-affairs. Even now, there are so few in-patient beds that they can usually be given only to people who present a risk of suicide or a serious risk of self-harm or a serious risk of neglect. controversial proposal.
17 Some critics of the Draft Bill claim that it represents a dilution of the current 'treatability test'.
The treatability test is contained in section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. It provides, amongst other things, that a person suffering from psychopathic disorder may be detained only if he is 'treatable '. 18 Critics say this test is being diluted because it makes it too hard to detain psychopaths.
In fact, and perhaps surprisingly, the Government agrees with this analysis. It says the treatability test, "[...] has led to uncertainty about whether a patient's disorder can be treated or not, irrespective of any opinion that they remain a risk to themselves or others. Some patients are not being brought under the Act even when it is appropriate to do so."
19
This conclusion is wrong. The Government has misunderstood several important legal judgments and, as a result, exaggerated the strength of the treatability test. Its proposal is a solution to a problem that doesn't exist.
20
As used in the Mental Health Act, the term 'medical treatment' currently includes, "nursing [...] and care, habilitation and rehabilitation under medical supervision". 21 This is a very broad definition, which the courts have broadened still further. Now, the treatability test will be satisfied, and a patient will be detainable under the 1983 Act, if hospital treatment will prevent deterioration in his condition, or make him less uncooperative or more insightful; 22 or if it is likely to impact on his symptoms, even if it won't touch the substantive illness. 23 In Wheldon, the High Court said, "It is plain [...] that the concept [of treatability] is a very wide one"; 24 while in Reid, the House of Lords said the definition of 'treatment' was now so wide that its purpose "may extend from cure to containment".
25
There must be very few patients whose condition -or the symptoms of whose condition -cannot be alleviated, or whose deterioration cannot be prevented, by some form of clinical intervention. It is difficult, therefore, to see how the treatability test in the 1983 Act is anything other than a dead letter, and surprising, perhaps, that the Government should be willing to risk so much to abolish it.
26
The desire to make psychopaths detainable, and the mistaken belief that they aren't already detainable, are at the centre of the Government's plans for a new Mental Health Act. In fact, some might say that they have distorted those plans. That is unfortunate. But it shouldn't just colour our view of the Draft Bill; it should also affect the way we think about the current Act.
Non-resident Patients
Under the Draft Mental Health Bill, a person to whom compulsion is applied when he is not in hospital will be a 'non-resident patient'. 27 The Government has been disingenuous about its motive for making this change.
(a) Motive
Most recently, the Government claimed that non-resident patients were the embodiment of the principle of the 'least restrictive alternative'. This principle is best summarised in the Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice, which states that anyone who is subject to the Act should, "be given any necessary treatment or care in the least controlled and segregated facilities compatible with ensuring their own health or safety or the safety of other people." 29 This is the spirit the Government wishes to invoke now. In a paper published alongside the Draft Bill, it said: "The intention of allowing patients to be under formal powers in the community is to provide greater flexibility to practitioners so that the principle of least restriction can be put into effect." 30 However, five years ago the Government said something rather different. In its White Paper it said, "At the moment clinicians have to wait until patients in the community become ill enough to need admission to hospital before compulsory treatment can be given. This prevents early intervention to reduce risk to both patients and the public".
31
Far from reflecting the 'principle of least restriction', it seems that community compulsion -in other words, the 'non-resident patient' scheme -is necessary to protect the public. Here, and not perhaps for the first time, the Government might be accused of trying to appeal to two different, even antipathetic, constituencies.
The Government may have been disingenuous about is plans, but is it possible that community compulsion is already a reality; that many people outside hospital are 'non-resident patients' in all but name?
(b) Leave
It is necessary to consider the case of DR. 32 In that case, a patient's detention under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 was renewed for a further 6 months even though she was on unlimited leave of absence. The only relevant requirement was that she return to hospital for the ward round every Monday and OT every Friday. The High Court said it was lawful to renew the patient's This decision has been seen as re-introducing the 'long leash' that doctors had been asked to abjure since the case of Hallstrom, 34 and it has been confirmed, and possibly even extended, by the recent High Court decision in the case of CS. 35 It has always been clear that, as a matter of general law, a patient may have her leave revoked, and she may be recalled to hospital, at any time by her Responsible Medical Officer ('RMO').
36
Provided she is given the relevant notice in writing, it isn't necessary for the RMO to have a good reason for revocation and recall, or for the RMO to have any reason at all.
What the DR and CS cases suggest is that by the careful use of section 17, a person who remains 'liable to be detained' in hospital may be maintained in the community indefinitely and hauled back into hospital if she acts inappropriately. There would appear to be no difference between that patient's situation and the situation of a 'non-resident patient' under the Draft Mental Health Bill.
The Code of Practice
Like the present Mental Health Act, the next one will have a Code of Practice.
37 However, on the face of it, the next Code will be less binding than the present one.
It would seem from the Draft Mental Health Bill that hospitals and practitioners will only need to "have regard" to the new Code. 38 The fear is that this would strip the Code of Practice of its essential force.
Whilst that may be a legitimate concern, it is questionable whether the new proposals diminish the Code of Practice at all. In the Munjaz case, the House of Lords held that the Code of Practice on the 1983 Act was guidance, and not binding, and that professionals and providers might lawfully depart from it if they had "cogent reason" to do so. (The Court of Appeal had earlier held that departures from the Code would be lawful where there was "good reason" for them.) 39
An Approved Mental Health Professional
The Approved Mental Health Professional is the replacement for the Approved Social Worker ('ASW'), and the ASW role is to be abolished. The Government's proposals in this regard are perhaps the most perplexing in the whole Draft Bill. 
(a) Motive
The Government has given six main reasons for introducing a new Mental Health Act. 40 Two of them concern the ASW, and looked at from that perspective, they appear to lack logic.
(i) Up-dating principles
In 1999, the Government said it wanted to "bring up to date the principles and processes established by the 1959 and 1983 Mental Health Acts".
41
One of the key principles of the current Act was the balancing of the 'medical model' of mental illness with the 'social model'. Because he was seen as an arch proponent of the social model, the ASW was given significant powers. However, the Draft Bill abolishes the ASW role.
In future, it is the Approved Mental Health Professional who will make an application for compulsion, and he won't have to be a social worker. He might be a community psychiatric nurse or an occupational therapist, and he might even be employed by the NHS trust that is to be responsible for subjecting a patient to compulsion.
42
Where does that leave the 'social model' of mental illness? More generally, how far can a Government go with legislation before the principles it hopes to up-date it actually destroys?
(ii) Inadequate knowledge
The Government has said that the way the current Mental Health Act is applied varies widely between different parts of the country, and that this has something to do with a lack of knowledge amongst mental health professionals. Though they are "mostly people with professional training in clinical and social care," the Government says, "few have specialist training in or understanding of the law". 43 However, this suggestion raises more questions than it answers.
If professionals know too little about the existing Mental Health Act, why is a new Mental Health Act required? Wouldn't the answer be to provide more and better training on the existing Act? The one group of professionals that does receive specialist training in mental health law is ASWs, yet, as has been noted, the Draft Bill would abolish their role.
The Government is deeply confused about its motives for abolishing the ASW. However, it is also necessary to ask whether the Approved Mental Health Professional, or something very like him, is already a feature of psychiatric practice, more than two years before the Draft Bill is scheduled to become law. November 2005
(b) Proposals
As has been indicated, it won't be necessary for an Approved Mental Health Professional to be a social worker. 44 If, in a particular case, he should turn out to be a community psychiatric nurse or an occupational therapist, there are two principal fears.
The first fear is that in that case, not only the two recommendations but also the compulsion application itself would be provided by someone whose primary allegiance was to the 'medical model' of mental health, and that as a result, the 'social model' would be ignored.
The Government has tried to address this fear. It has said, "The competence required of an AMHP will be broadly similar to that required of an ASW currently". 45 However, a nurse is not a social worker, and their perspectives, training and experience differ very widely. Therefore, the loss of the social model must remain a legitimate fear.
The second fear is about a loss of independence. 46 At the moment, the ASW is not only the sole exemplar of the 'social model'; he is also wholly independent and cannot, for example, be compelled to make an admission application.
If it will be possible in future for a compulsion application to be made by an employee of the body that is to do the compelling, the fear is that he will be more biddable than an ASW would have been and that a crucial element of independence will have been lost. That, again, is a legitimate fear.
However, given what the law allows even now, is the feared position really so far away?
Here, it is necessary to consider partnership working, which perhaps reaches its culmination in the Care Trust. In most if not all of the mental health partnerships and care trusts that have been created so far great pains have been taken to keep local authority mental health functions outside the formal structure of the partnership or trust. However, the simple truth is that this is more than the law requires.
Partnership arrangements between local authorities and NHS bodies have been possible since the year 2000, when section 31 of the Health Act 1999 came into force. Under the relevant regulations, a social services authority may give nearly all of its "health related functions" (as they are defined in Schedule 1 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970) to the partnership, and thereby delegate the performance of those functions to its NHS partner. 47 (In fact, the only "health related functions" a local authority can't give away are the appointment of ASWs and its powers of entry and inspection).
This means that where there is a mental health partnership or care trust, a whole swathe of local authority mental health functions could pass to a NHS trust. They include: directing an ASW to consider making an admission application; 48 receiving a patient into guardianship; 49 and providing after-care once a patient has left hospital.
50
If the relevant agreement so provides, all of these local authority functions will be performed by a NHS body, and the staff that perform them, including any ASWs, will be answerable to that NHS body.
This could be seen as a positive thing. Under these arrangements the 'social model' of mental health is not left on the periphery; it is moved to the very centre of the detention process and allowed to compete on equal terms with the 'medical model'. However, there is another way of seeing it.
There is nothing in the new partnership possibilities that would allow a NHS trust to order an ASW to make an admission application, so that element of independence is preserved. However, where there is formal partnership working there is at least the possibility that all other functions of an ASW, and all other mental health functions of a local authority, will be under the direct control of a NHS trust.
Ultimately, of course, the social services authority will be still be liable for the way someone else performs the health-related functions it has given them. However, the new arrangements mean much more than ASWs occasionally being managed by health professionals.
Even now, long before the Draft Bill becomes a reality, the context in which a detention application is to be judged could be an avowedly medical one, and the entire statutory process -from assessment to aftercare -could be performed by practitioners whose primary fealty is owed to the NHS body that will do the detaining.
One of the other functions a social services authority can give to a partnership is the function of being a patient's Nearest Relative under the 1983 Act.
51 This means that a NHS trust that is "the managers" of a hospital for the purposes of the Act could also find that it is the Nearest Relative of a patient whom it is detaining or, where it has assumed such responsibilities, of a patient of whom it is also the Guardian. Though undoubtedly intriguing, these are also troubling possibilities.
Incapable patients
It is necessary to consider the case of MH.
52 This case concerned a young woman who was detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983. Because an application had been made to displace her mother as the 'nearest relative', the patient's detention continued long after the usual 28-day period had come to an end.
The Court of Appeal held that where a section 2 patient is 'incapable' of making an application to a Mental Health Review Tribunal, there should be a system to ensure that her case comes before a tribunal. And it said that because the current Mental Health Act doesn't provide such a system, it is incompatible with the 'right to liberty' in Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
There are at least two ways of interpreting this decision. The first interpretation says that incapable patients who are detained must have the same Mental Health Act rights as capable patients. This is the more restrictive interpretation. However, it still has some quite significant implications. It means, for example: that the current Act will have to be amended, in order to give incapable section 2 patients something like an automatic right of appeal; that section 3 patients who are 51 MHA 1983, s The MH judgment suggests that it's all or nothing: that incapable patients must have the same rights as capable patients if they are subject to detention.
The Government dismissed Professor Richardson's proposals for a capacity-based system of compulsion, and its Green Paper, White Paper and first Draft Bill didn't admit capacity as an issue at all.
57
The current Draft Mental Health Bill offers some small concessions: it gives capable patients the right to refuse ECT, 58 and to refuse to be transferred to another hospital. 59 It doesn't give similar rights to incapable patients, so maybe it too is called into question by the MH decision.
There might be a second, more far-reaching interpretation of the MH judgment. It may be that there is no justification for giving incapable patients fewer rights of any kind -and not just fewer Mental Health Act rights -than are enjoyed by capable patients. In other words, maybe incapable patients -even incapable patients who are detained in hospital -cannot be treated any differently just because they are incapable. This is where the Bournewood case comes in.
In the HL case, 60 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that it was unlawful, and that it would breach the right to liberty in Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to admit an incapable patient to hospital under the common law doctrine of 'necessity' if what was to be done to him there would amount to a deprivation of his liberty. And it interpreted In making its current proposals, the Government has held up an inconvenient mirror, one in which our current mental health laws are rather alarmingly reflected. And the shapes that form in that inconvenient mirror force us to confront a worrying possibility. 65 It may be that what we would like to see -what we have until now tried to see -as flaws in the Draft Bill are actually something quite different: maybe they're really hard, durable, unyielding seams deep within the Mental Health Act we already have.
